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Abstract
In this paper, the issue of document
structuring is addressed. To achieve this
task, we advocate that Segmented Dis-
course Representation Theory (SDRT)
is a most expressive discourse frame-
work. Then we sketch a discourse plan-
ning mechanism which aims at pro-
ducing as many paraphrastic document
structures as possible from a set of fac-
tual data encoded into a logical form.
1 Introduction
Using the terms of (Reiter and Dale, 2000), we
consider that the Document Planner architecture
is pipelined: first the content determination task
does its work, and then the document structuring
task takes the result and build a document plan.
Following the work of (Roussarie, 2000), we
adopt SDRT (Asher, 1993; Asher and Lascarides,
1998), which was designed first for text under-
standing, for the document structuring task1.
The input to the document structuring compo-
nent is a set of factual data encoded into a logical
form, as in (1).
(1) ∃ e1, e2, x, y (e1–leave(x) ∧ e2–fit-of-
tears(y) ∧ cause(e1, e2) ∧
x =Fred ∧ y =Mary ∧ e1 < now ∧ e2 <
now)
This level of representation is supposed to be
language independent, although we use English-
like predicates for the sake of simplification. (1)
1As far as we know, Roussarie is the first author who has
adopted SDRT for text generation. The work presented here
differs from his work in the following: content determination
and document structuring are pipelined here, while they are
interleaved in his work.
includes a conceptual (language independent) re-
lation, i.e. cause, between the events e1 and e2.
A document plan is a SDRS. Our goal is to pro-
duce a wide range of paraphrases from the same
factual data. For example, from the logical form
in (1), we want to produce at least all the texts
in (2). These texts have different communicative
structures and so correspond to different commu-
nicative goals. However, these issues will not be
addressed here.
(2) a. Fred left. Therefore, Mary burst into a fit
of tears.
b. Mary burst into a fit of tears because Fred
left.
c. Fred left. His leaving brought Mary into
a fit of tears.
d. Mary burst into a fit of tears. This is due
to Fred’s leaving.
To produce paraphrases, we start by produc-
ing several document plans (i.e. SDRSs) from
the same factual data. The SDRS underlying (2a)
is in (3a) in which the discourse relation Re-
sult between pi1 and pi2 expresses the predicate
cause(e1, e2). The SDRS underlying (2b) is sim-
ilar to (3a) except that Explanation(pi2, pi1) is in-
volved instead of Result(pi1, pi2). The SDRS un-
derlying (2c) is in (3b). It includes the dis-
course relation Commentary2 defined in (Asher,
1993). To ensure the cohesion of texts, we add
the following constraint to his definition: Com-
mentary(pi1, pi2) requires that one element in pi2
is coreferent with one element in pi1, as it is the
case in (3b) with e3 = e1. In (3b), the causal
relation has been reified as the discourse referent
f (see section 5). This discourse referent is ex-
2The discourse relation in (2c) is not Result since the
second sentence denotes both the cause and the effect.
pressed through the verb bring into3. The SDRS
underlying (2d) is similar to (3b).
(3) a. pi1 pi2
pi1 :
e1 x
x = Fred
e1–leave(x)
e1 < now
pi2 :
e2 y
y = Mary
e2–fit-of-tears(y)
e2 < now
Result(pi1, pi2)
b. pi1 pi2
pi1 :
e1 x
x = Fred
e1–leave(x)
e1 < now
pi2 :
e2 e3 y f
y = Mary
e2–fit-of-tears(y)
f–cause(e3, e2)
e3 = e1
e2 < now
Commentary(pi1, pi2)
When provided as input to a “tactical compo-
nent” (microplanner and surface realizer), a given
SDRS leads to zero, one or several texts. It leads to
nothing when there is a lexical (or syntactic) gap
in the target language. For example, if there is
no verbal predicate semantically equivalent to be
due to in the target language, the SDRS underly-
ing (2d) leads to nothing. Similarly, if a SDRS in-
cludes a discourse relation which cannot be real-
ized in the target language (e.g. volitional-Result
proposed in (Mann and Thompson, 1987) can-
not be linguistically realized in French (Danlos,
1998)), it leads to nothing4. A given SDRS leads
to several texts when there are several lexicaliza-
tions for at least one predicate.
Thanks to the use of SDRT, we are able to give
a formal background to the following assump-
3In the generation community, causative verbal predi-
cates such as bring into or provoke are considered as elemen-
tary ones, although it should not be so. For example, Elixir
provokes an allergic reaction is not analyzed and so is sim-
ply represented as (allergic-reaction (Elixir)) in (Bouayad-
Agha et al., 2000). Whereas, it should get a representation
translating x’s taking Elixir causes x’s having an allergic re-
action with a causal relation between two events.
4We adopt the position that there exists a set of discourse
relations which are likely to be language independent.
tions generally used in bottom-up document-
structuring approaches:
• “The content determination mechanism has
produced a set of messages which are re-
quired to be included in the final document
plan” (Reiter and Dale, 2000, p. 114). In for-
mal terms, it translates as follows: a SDRS
pi built from a logical form LF is such that
the logical form derived from pi is logically
equivalent to LF. For example, the logical
forms derived from the SDRSs in (3a) and
(3b) are equivalent to that in (1) modulo ax-
ioms which will be presented in section 4.
• “The NLG system has a means of determin-
ing what discourse relation (if any) can be
used to link two particular messages or com-
ponent document plans” (Reiter and Dale,
2000, p. 114). Our formal approach is based
on reversing the SDRT conditions to estab-
lish discourse relations. As an illustration, in
SDRT for text understanding, there is the Ax-
iom in (4) for Narration. This axiom states
that if Narration holds between two SDRSs
pi1 and pi2, then the main event (me) of pi1
happens before the main event of pi2.
(4) (Narration(pi1, pi2) → me(pi1) < me(pi2))
For text generation, this axiom is reversed in
the rule in (5) which is domain and language
independent. (5) is taken from (Roussarie,
2000, p. 154).
(5) • If k and k′ are DRS the main eventuali-
ties of which are not states,
• and if the main event of k occurs before
the main event of k′,
• then Narration(pi, pi′) is a valid relation,
where pi and pi′ respectively label k and
k′.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives a crash course in SDRT. Section 3 com-
pares our approach to document structuring to
those based on RST. Section 4 explains the ax-
ioms needed to lay down the logical equivalence
of SDRSs such that (3a) and (3b). Section 5 ex-
plains the process for building SDRSs. Section 6
sketches how to generate a text from a SDRS. Sec-
tion 7 illustrates the document structuring strategy
on examples.
2 Crash course in SDRT
2.1 Introduction
SDRT (Segmented Discourse Representation The-
ory) was introduced in (Asher, 1993) as an exten-
sion of DRT (Discourse Representation Theory,
(Kamp and Reyle, 1993)) in order to account for
specific properties of discourse structure.
The original motivation for developing SDRT
can be found in Asher’s study of the reference
to abstract objects in discourse. Asher argues
that a sound discourse theory has to cope with
some anaphora whose antecedents turn out to be
text segments larger than a clause or a sentence.
Moreover, it is necessary to reveal a hierarchical
discourse structure which makes appear the sites
available for anaphora–antecedent binding. Con-
sider the example in (6) taken from (Asher, 1993,
p. 318):
(6) (1) After 38 months, America is back in
space. (2) The shuttle Discovery roared off
the pad from Cape Kennedy at 10:38 this
morning. (3) The craft and crew performed
flawlessly. (4) Later in the day the TDRS
shuttle communication satellite was success-
fully deployed. (5) This has given a much
needed boost to NASA morale.
The pronoun this (6.5) can only refer to the
whole trip or (possibly) to the last mentioned
event (TDRS launch). Consequently, the struc-
ture of (6) must be such that : i) there exists
a constituent which semantically encompasses
the whole story (6.1–4), and ii) neither (6.2) nor
(6.3) correspond to available constituents for the
anaphora resolution when computing the attach-
ment of (6.5) in the context. Avaibility (or open-
ness) of constituents is a formal property that can
be accounted for by the use of discourse relations.
2.2 DRSs as formal discourse units
SDRT can be viewed as a super-layer on DRT
whose expressiveness is enhanced by the use of
discourse relations. Thus the DRT structures (Dis-
course Representation Structures or DRS) are han-
dled as basic discourse units in SDRT.
Formally, a DRS is a couple of sets 〈U,Con〉.
U (the universe) is the set of discourse referents.
Con is a set of conditions which describe the
meaning of the discourse in a truth-conditional
semantics fashion. For instance, the DRS repre-
senting the sentence (7a) is given in (7b).
(7) a. Fred left.
b. x e
x = Fred
e–leave(x)
e < now
Note that in addition to individual referents (x),
U includes event referents (e). DRT adopts a
Davidsonian approach (Davidson, 1967): it con-
siders that events have to be denoted by singu-
lar terms in the logical form of sentences. In the
semantic model, events are handled as world im-
manent entities, and event referents (e) can occur
in argumental slots of certain predicates (like f-
cause(e3, e2) in (3b)). The statement e–leave(x)
is a predicative notational variant and stands for
“e is a leaving of x”.
DRSs do not correspond to linguistic categories
but are formal units: from the SDRT point of
view, one should see them as (intensional) mean-
ing structures. This is why some discourse ab-
stract objects (such as facts, situations, proposi-
tions...) can be referred to by discourse referents
(we will say that they are reified) and semantically
characterized by (sub-)DRS. (8) is an example of a
fact reading, where≈ is the characterization pred-
icate (Asher, 1993, p. 145).
(8) a. The fact that Fred left abruptly upset
Mary.
b. x y e′ f
x =Fred
f ≈
e
e–leave(x)
abrupt(e)
y =Mary
e′–upset(f, y)
2.3 Discourse Relations and SDRSs
A SDRS is a couple of sets 〈U,Con〉. U is a set of
labels of DRS or SDRS which may be viewed as
“speech act discourse referents” (Asher and Las-
carides, 1998). Con is a set of conditions on la-
bels of the form:
• pi : K, where pi is a label from U and K is a
(S)DRS (labelling);
• R(pii, pij), where pii and pij are labels and R
a discourse relation (structuring).
The set of SDRT relations includes Narration
(for temporal sequence), Background (for tempo-
ral overlap), Elaboration (for whole-part or topic-
development), Explanation and Result (for cau-
sation), Commentary (for gloss).
According to (Asher, 1993, p. 319), (9)
sketches the SDR-theoretic analysis of (6) where
each ki stands for the DRS representing the con-
tent of the ith sentence in (6).
(9) pi1 pi′1 pi5
pi1 : k1
pi′1 :
pi2 pi3 pi4
pi2 : k2 pi3 : k3 pi4 : k4
Commentary(pi2, pi3)
Narration(pi2, pi4)
Elaboration(pi1, pi′1)
pi5 : k5 Commentary(pi1, pi5)
SDRSs are built by means of non monotonic
rules that encodes discourse properties and world
knowledge. For instance, one rule states that if
a discourse constituent β may be connected to a
discourse constituent α in the context, then nor-
mally the relation Narration(α, β) holds. Another
rule states that if β may be connected to α and if
the main event of β, i.e. me(β), is known as a
cause of me(α), then normally the relation Ex-
planation(α, β) holds.
3 Comparison with RST
As nearly everybody in the NLG community uses
RST (Rhetorical Structure Theory, (Mann and
Thompson, 1987)) as a discourse framework, it
is generally considered that the task of document
structuring is to produce a tree in the RST style.
Since RST is a descriptive theory without any
formal background, there exists a wide range of
interpretations and several notions of Rhetorical
Structure. For some authors, e.g. (Marcu et al.,
2000), the Rhetorical Structure is very surfacic:
it is an ordered tree isomorphic to the linearized
structure of the text and a rhetorical relation can
be viewed as a nickname for a small set of cue
phrases. For other authors, the rhetorical structure
is more abstract: it aims at representing meaning.
For example, in (RAGS Project, 1999; Bouayad-
Agha et al., 2000), the Rhetorical Structure is
an unordered tree in which terminal nodes rep-
resent elementary propositions, while non termi-
nal nodes represent rhetorical relations which are
abstract relations such as cause. This rhetorical
representation is mapped into a Document Rep-
resentation which is an ordered tree reflecting the
surfacic structure of the text.
Our approach is closer to the RAGS’one if we
consider our logical form as equivalent to their
Rhetorical Structures. However, we differ ba-
sically on the following point: their Rhetorical
Structure is a tree, while our logical form, when
graphically represented, is a (connex) graph and
not a tree. Let us justify our position by consider-
ing the discourses in (10).
(10) a. Fred run the vacuum cleanerA while Sue
was sleepingB in order to bother herC .
b. Fred run the vacuum cleanerA while Sue
was sleepingB in order to please herC .
They can be given various meanings, however
we focus on the following:
• for (10a), running the vacuum cleaner is
supposed to be noisy and Fred attempts to
bother Sue by making something noisy ex-
actly when she is sleeping,
• for (10b), running the vacuum cleaner is sup-
posed to be an awful chore and Fred attempts
to please Sue by relieving her of a chore. It
just happens that he run the vacuum cleaner
while she was sleeping.
In RST, both (10a) and (10b) are given the tree
representation in (11), in which CIRC abbreviates
CIRCUMSTANCE.
(11) CIRC C
A B
N S
SN
PURPOSE
The semantic interpretation of a rhetorical tree
is given by the “nuclearity principle” (Marcu,
1996): whenever two large spans are connected
through a rhetorical relation, that rhetorical rela-
tion holds also between the most important parts
of the constituent spans. In (11), the nuclear-
ity principle amounts to saying that there is only
one interpretation, namely that in which the nu-
cleus argument of PURPOSE is A, which is the
nucleus argument of CIRCUMSTANCE. This is the
right interpretation for (10b). However, (11) can-
not represent the meaning of (10a) for which the
first (nucleus) argument of PURPOSE is the sub-
tree rooted at CIRCUMSTANCE. In conclusion, a
RST tree structure is too poor: it cannot account
for the expressiveness of texts. This can be ac-
counted for by the use of representations which
correspond graphically to (connex) graphs. The
graphical representations of (10a) and (10b) and
their equivalent in pseudo logical forms are re-
spectively shown in (12a) and (12b)5.
(12) a. PURPOSE
1 2 CIRC1 2
A B

D
C
∃A,B,C,D (D–CIRC(A,B) ∧ PURPOSE(D,C))
b. PURPOSE CIRC
2 1 1 2
C A B
∃A,B,C (CIRC(A,B) ∧ PURPOSE(A,C))
(12a) is a tree in which the first argument of
PURPOSE is D, the sub-tree rooted at CIRCUM-
STANCE. It is the interpretation of the RST tree
in (11) without the nuclearity principle. (12b) is
a graph in which A is part of two relations6. This
graph corresponds to the interpretation of the RST
tree in (11) given by the nuclearity principle. This
principle makes that A is part of both the rela-
tion PURPOSE with C and the relation CIRCUM-
STANCE with its satellite B.
The SDRSs underlying (10a) and (10b) are
shown respectively in (13a) and (13b) (the nota-
tion KA stands for the DRS representing A and
so on). Here we replace CIRCUMSTANCE by the
SDRT relation Background for temporal overlap7.
5The arguments of a binary semantic predicate are noted
as 1 and 2 after the fashion of MTT (Meaning to Text Theory,
(Mel’cˇuk, 1988)) and not as Nucleus and Satellite in the RST
tradition.
6This graph can be annotated to mark the element(s)
which are focused on.
7Actually, the SDR-theoretical representations of (13)
should be more complex with a pseudo-topic that would span
(13) a. pi3 pi4
pi3 :
pi1 pi2
pi1 : KA pi2 : KB
Background(pi1, pi2)
pi4 : KC
Purpose(pi3, pi4)
b. pi1 pi2 pi3
pi1 : KA pi2 : KB pi3 : KC
Background(pi1, pi2)
Purpose(pi1, pi3)
In (13a), the first argument of Purpose is pi3
which groups KA and KB which are linked
through Background. In (13b), pi1 is part of two
discourse relations. The graphical representations
of (13a) and (13b) (in which R(pi1, pi2) is repre-
sented as a tree rooted at R ) have the same topol-
ogy as (12a) and (12b) respectively.
In summary, in document structuring ap-
proaches based on RST, a rhetorical structure is
always a tree, whenever understood as abstract
representation or a more surfacic one. This cannot
be maintained. First, if the rhetorical structure is
an abstract conceptual representation closed to a
logical form, its graphical representation is a con-
nex graph (and not always a tree). Second, if the
rhetorical structure is a discourse representation,
as it is the case for SDRS, its graphical represen-
tation is also a connex graph.
This criticism is not the only one against RST.
This discourse framework has already been criti-
cized in the generation community (de Smedt et
al., 1996). So we advocate the use of SDRT. This
theory presents the following advantages :
• it is a formalized theory which benefits of
all the progress in formal semantics most of-
ten realized in the understanding perspective
around DRT or SDRT.
• adopting SDRT for text generation by “re-
versing” the rules (see (4) reversed in (5)) al-
lows us to have reversible systems: the same
linguistic data can be used for both text un-
derstanding and generation.
• as it will be shown in section 5, the document
structuring component a` la SDRT gives hint
on referring expressions: it indicates when a
the Background -related constituents. See (Asher and Las-
carides, 1998) for details.
discourse referent should be expressed as an
anaphoric NP.
• a SDRS (i.e. a document plan) can be given to
existing microplanners and surface realizers
with perhaps some modifications (see sec-
tion 6). For example, a SDRS can be given as
input to G-TAG (Danlos, 2000) implemented
in CLEF (Meunier and Reyes, 1999) pro-
vided small fits are realized.
In conclusion, we think that SDRT is a better
discourse framework than RST (for both text gen-
eration and understanding).
4 Equivalence between logical forms
Recall that we want to compute both the SDRS in
(3a) with Result and the SDRS in (3b) with Com-
mentary from the logical form in (1). Let us show
that the logical forms derived from these SDRSs
are equivalent. In SDRT, there is an axiom for Re-
sult from which one can entail the rule in (14),
which is similar to the axiom in (4) for Narration.
(14) Result(pi1, pi2) → cause(me(pi1),me(pi2))
Therefore, the logical form derived from (3a)
is (1) repeated in (15) without the temporal infor-
mation.
(15) ∃ e1, e2, x, y (e1–leave(x) ∧ e2–fit-of-
tears(y) ∧ cause(e1, e2) ∧
x =Fred ∧ y =Mary)
The discourse relation Commentary per se
does not add information. Therefore, the logical
form derived from (3b) is (16).
(16) ∃ e1, e2, f, x, y (e1–leave(x) ∧
e2–fit-of-tears(y) ∧ f–cause(e1, e2) ∧ x =
Fred ∧ y = Mary)
The difference between (15) and (16) consists
in considering the causal relation between the two
events either as only a predicate or as a variable
plus a predicate. However, the axioms in (17a)
and (17b) can be laid down. With these axioms,
(15) and (16) are equivalent since they are both
equivalent to (18), in which the causal relation
gets represented twice. In other words, we have
the following logical entailments: (15), (17a) `
(18), and (16), (17b) ` (18).
(17) a. ∀x, y cause(x, y) → ∃z z–cause(x, y)
b. ∀x, y, z z–cause(x, y) → cause(x, y)
(18) ∃ e1, e2, f, x, y (e1–leave(x) ∧
e2–fit-of-tears(y) ∧ f–cause(e1, e2) ∧
cause(e1, e2) ∧ x = Fred ∧ y = Mary)
Let us underline that the content determination
task may arbitrarily result in (15), (16) or even
(18). Therefore, the document structuring task
has to produce SDRS such as (3a) and (3b) from
one of these logical forms.
There is a an important difference between
SDRSs and logical forms. SDRSs represent dis-
courses and their variables are discourse refer-
ents. Logical forms represent meanings and their
variables are pure logical variables. To compute
a SDRS from a logical form, one has to decide
which variables from the logical form become
discourse referents, as explained in the next sec-
tion.
5 Building SDRSs
5.1 Basic principles
To get a recursive process, first, we translate the
logical form into a DRS8. In case of a purely
existential formula such as those we have been
dealing with so far, this just amounts to putting
all the variables into the universe of the DRS and
split the formula into elementary conjoined con-
ditions9. The document structuring task amounts
then in building a SDRS from a DRS. The simplest
way to do that is simply to transform :
universe
conditions into
pi
pi :
universe
conditions
.
More complex structures are obtained by split-
ting the DRS into sub-DRSs as illustrated below.
8This DRS is considered as a logical representation. It is
not yet a discourse representation.
9More complex formulas are not considered here.
universe
condition1
condition2
condition3
condition4
condition5
condition6
condition7
−→
pi1 pi2 pi3
pi1 :
universe1
condition1
condition7
pi2 :
universe2
condition2
condition5
pi3 :
universe3
condition4
R1(pi1, pi2)↔ condition3
R2(pi2, pi3)↔ condition6
R1(pi1, pi2) ↔ condition3 means that the dis-
course relation R1 to be established between pi1
and pi2 must have condition3 among its conse-
quences: no other element is in charge of express-
ing condition3.
In SDRT for text understanding, the conditions
are not ordered. However, in text generation, a
document plan indicates the order of its compo-
nents. As a consequence, when a document plan
is a SDRS, its components (labelled pii) have to be
ordered. In the pseudo SDRS above, it is supposed
that pi1 precedes pi2 which precedes pi3.
Let us examine the principles governing the
splitting of the conditions and the universes. For
the splitting of the conditions, the whole con-
tent of the factual database has to be verbalized.
Therefore all the conditions in the DRS have to be
expressed in the SDRS. Two cases appear:
• either a condition in the DRS appears as a
condition in one of the sub-DRS; that is the
case for condition1 in the DRS labelled pi1;
• or it is expressed through a discourse rela-
tion; that is the case for condition3. One of
the criteria for choosing an appropriate dis-
course relation is that its consequences have
to contain the condition involved. For ex-
ample, the condition cause(e1, e2) can be ex-
pressed through Result(pi1, pi2) when pi1 and
pi2 label the sub-DRSs that contain the de-
scriptions of e1 and e2 respectively.
Let us now look on how to determine the
universes of the sub-DRSs, i.e. the discourse
referents. First, there are technical constraints,
namely:
• the arguments of any condition in a sub-DRS
must appear in the universe of this DRS;
• the universes of all the sub-DRSs have to be
disjoint. This constraint is the counterpart
of the following constraint in understanding:
“partial DRSs introduce new discourse refer-
ents” (Asher, 1993, p. 71).
These two constraints are not independent. As-
suming that the first constraint is respected, the
second one can be respected with the following
mechanism: if a variable x already appears in a
preceding sub-DRS labelled pix, then a brand new
variable y is created in the universe of the current
sub-DRS labelled piy and the condition y = x is
added into the conditions of piy. The discourse
referent y will be generated as an anaphora if pix
is available to piy (see section 2.1), otherwise it
will be generated as a definite or demonstrative
NP.
Secondly, as mentioned in section 4, it has
to be decided which variables become dis-
course referents. When we have for instance
∃f, e1, e2 f–cause(e1, e2), we can decide to apply
axiom (17b), and then remove the variable f and
every condition having f as an argument (in par-
ticular the condition f–cause(e1, e2)). In order for
such an operation to be valid, we have to ensure
that no information is lost. In practice, this sup-
poses that no other condition than f–cause(e1, e2)
has f as an argument. We call this operation de-
reification. Conversely from such a formula as
∃e1, e2 cause(e1, e2), we can apply axiom (17a),
and then remove the condition cause(e1, e2). We
call this operation reification. Contrarily to de-
reification, no information can be lost. These two
operation are a mix between something which is
pure logic (that adds information) and a discourse
operation that deals with discourse referents. As
our objective is to build as much dicourse plans
as possible, reification and de-reification are sys-
tematically performed whenever possible.
The process is recursive: once all this is done
(splitting the conditions, universes determina-
tion (including reification and de-reification) and
choice of discourse relations), the process can ap-
ply recursively on each of the embedded DRSs
(this is the reason why the logical form is first
translated into a DRS).
5.2 Algorithm
A naive solution to implement these principles
will be first described. Next some refinements
will be proposed.
The naive solution amounts to considering all
the possible splittings of the set of conditions. If
there are n conditions, the number of sub-SDRSs
ranks from 1 to n. In the hypothesis of a splitting
into p sub-SDRSs, each condition may be put in
any of the p sub-SDRSs or in any of the p− 1 sets
of conditions to be expressed by a discourse re-
lation10. Next the universes of the sub-SDRSs are
built according to the principles described above.
This leads to availability constraints (e.g. pix is
available to piy) to be checked later on. In the next
step, the possible discourse relations are com-
puted according to their consequences. At this
step, a lot of hypotheses are ruled out. For ex-
ample, any hypothesis assuming that a condition
such as e–leave(x, y) is to be expressed through
a discourse relation will be ruled out. Finally, the
availability constraints have to be checked using
the same rules as in understanding.
With this naive solution, a lot of document
plans will be rejected by the linguistic component.
As an illustration, each sub-SDRS has to be ver-
balized as a clause (see section 6). Therefore, any
sub-SDRS that does not include an eventuality or a
fact will be rejected by the linguistic component.
This naive solution is theoretically valid, how-
ever it is not usable in practice. A lot of possible
failures can be foreseen. For example, the con-
ditions that can be expressed through a discourse
relation, e.g. cause(e1, e2), should be considered
first. If it is decided that such a condition is in-
deed expressed by a discourse relation, e.g. Re-
sult(pi1, pi2), then the sub-SDRSs pi1 and pi2 are
created with the conditions concerning e1 and e2
respectively.
To sum up, the process of splitting the condi-
tions should not be blind. The content of the con-
ditions has to be taken into account in order to
guide the splitting and avoid thereby failures that
can be foreseen. However, the details of this opti-
mization will not be presented here.
10In SDRT, any element in the universe of a SDRS must
be linked to another element. Therefore, a SDRS with p sub-
SDRSs must include (at least) p− 1 discourse relations.
6 Generating a text from a SDRS
A SDRS, i.e. a document plan, is given to a micro-
planner and surface realizer which computes one
or several texts. It is the topic of another paper to
explain in detail this process. Here we will only
give the basic principles which guide the choices
to be made in the tactical component.
The process to generate a text from a SDRS
〈U,Con〉 is basically recursive:
• an element pii in U has to be generated as
a clause if pii labels a DRS and recursively
as a text (possibly a complex sentence) if pii
labels a SDRS.
• a condition R(pii, pij) in Con has to be gener-
ated as a text “Si. Cue Sj .” or as a complex
sentence “Si Cue Sj .”, where Si generates
pii, Sj pij , and Cue is a cue phrase lexicaliz-
ing R (Cue may be empty).
• a condition pi : K in Con where K is a DRS
〈U,Con〉 has to generated as a clause accord-
ing to the following constraints:
– in analysis, a discourse referent is the
trace of either a determiner or an in-
flexion mark. Therefore, in generation,
a discourse referent has to be gener-
ated as an NP or a tensed verb (noted
V). Such an information is noted as e.g.
e1:NP/V;
– the conditions guide the lexical choices.
The conditions x = Fred correspond
to proper names which is noted as
x:PN[Fred]. The equality conditions
between discourse referents (e.g. x =
y) give rise to (pronominal or nominal)
anaphora which is noted as x:ANA[y].
The other conditions are associated to
lexical predicates.
With these constraints, an element which is
reified, e.g. f–cause(e1, e2), gives rise to an
NP or a verb (a cause of, provoke) and an ele-
ment which is not reified, e.g. cause(e1, e2),
gives rise to a modifier on e1 or e2 with e1
and e2 generated either as verbs or NPs.
This process results in a list such as:
– e1:NP/V[e1–leave(x)],
– x:PN[Fred(x)],
– f:NP/V[f–cause(e1, e2)],
– e2:NP/V[e2–fit-of-tears(y)],
– y:PN[Mary(y)].
Such a list guides the lexical choices
and syntactic realization performed by the
micro-planner.
7 Illustration on examples
Let us show how to compute the SDRSs in (3a)
and (3b) from the logical form in (1). First, this
formula is translated in the DRS in (19), in which
the conditions are numbered for the sake of con-
venience.
(19) e1 e2 x y
cond1: e1–leave(x)
cond2: e2–fit-of-tears(y)
cond3: cause(e1, e2)
cond4: x = Fred
cond5: y = Mary
cond6: e1 < now
cond7: e2 < now
¿From (19), one possibility is to express cond3
through Result(pi1, pi2) in which pi1 and pi2 label
the sub-DRSs grouping the conditions on e1 and
e2 respectively. Therefore, pi1 has to group cond1
and cond6. As cond1 introduces the variable x,
cond4 has to figure also in pi111. The universe
of the DRS labelled by pi1 is {e1, x}. Similarly
for pi2, its universe is {e2, y}, its conditions are
cond2, cond5 and cond7. All the conditions of
(19) are therefore expressed in (3a) which is a
well-formed document plan. Following the rules
sketched in section 6, (3a) will be generated in
(2a) by the linguistic component, if Result is lex-
icalized as the cue phrase therefore which links
two sentences.
¿From (19), another possibility is to split all
the conditions into two sub-DRSs: the first one la-
belled pi1 grouping the conditions on e1 (as in the
previous possibility), the second one labelled pi2
grouping all the other conditions. cond3 in pi2 has
e1 as argument. This variable already appears in
pi1. Therefore a brand new variable e3 is created
in the universe of pi2 and the condition e3 = e1
11This is an optimization: if cond4 were not included in
pi1, the surface realizer would fail on pi1 and the hypothesis
would be ruled out.
is added in pi2. As all the conditions are split into
the sub-DRSs, pi1 and pi2 have to be linked with a
discourse relation which adds no information (i.e.
which has no consequence). Commentary is such
a discourse relation, and it is valid here since its
constraint (one element in pi2 has to be corefer-
ent with one element in pi1, see section 1) is re-
spected with the coreference relation e3 = e1. At
this step, the SDRS in (20) has been built.
¿From (20), one possibility is to transmit this
SDRS as it is to the tactical component. If Com-
mentary is lexicalized as an empty cue phrase
linking two sentences, (20) will be generated in
(21) where cause(e3, e2), which is not reified, is
expressed through the modifier because of.
(20) pi1 pi2
pi1 :
e1 x
x = Fred
e1–leave(x)
e1 < now
pi2 :
e2 e3 y
y = Mary
e2–fit-of-tears(y)
cause(e3, e2)
e3 = e1
e2 < now
Commentary(pi1, pi2)
(21) Fred left. Mary burst into a fit of tears be-
cause of that.
In text understanding, (21) is likely to
be analyzed with the discourse relation
Narration(pi1, pi2), which has for consequence
e1 < e2. This condition is compatible with those
in pi2 since cause(e3, e2) with e3 = e1 implies
e1 < e2. So, there is no conflict between the
understanding and the generation of (21).
¿From (20), another possibility is to reify
cause(e3, e2) in pi2. The SDRS in (20) becomes
that in (3b). If f–cause is lexicalized as bring into
(a colloquial variant of cause when the second ar-
gument is a fit of tears), (2c) will be generated.
8 Conclusion
We have dealt with the document structuring task,
considering that it should be able to produce sev-
eral outputs so that it can cope, among other
things, with real lexical gaps in the target lan-
guage (and also actual gaps in a realistic surface
realizer). We therefore aim at producing as much
document plans as possible.
We suppose that the content determination
component provides a logical form encoding the
factual data to be linguistically verbalized. Ax-
ioms may apply on this logical form which en-
able reifications and de-reifications. As a conse-
quence, some predicates may be realized either as
a verb, an NP or a modifier.
The document structuring component is based
on SDRT, a formalized discourse framework
which can account for the expressiveness of texts,
contrarily to RST. A document plan is a SDRS.
This level of representation is likely to be lan-
guage and domain independent and can be pro-
vided to existing surface realizers. Building
SDRSs from a logical form is a recursive process
for which a basic strategy has been presented and
exemplified.
No implementation has been realized yet, how-
ever we foresee to do it and to interface it with the
tactical component CLEF (Meunier and Reyes,
1999).
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